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Primitive accumulation, the social common, 
and the contractual lockdown of recording 
artists at the threshold of digitalization 
Matt Stahl 
This article examines the apparent paradox of the persistence of long-term employment contracts for 
cultural industry ‘talent’ in the context of broader trends toward short-term, flexible employment. While 
aspirants are numberless, bankable talent is in short supply. Long-term talent contracts appear to embody 
a durable, perhaps inherent, axiom in employment: labour shortage favours employees. The article 
approaches this axiom through the lens of recent reconsiderations of the concept of ‘primitive 
accumulation’. In the case of employment, this concept highlights employers’ impetus to transcend legal 
and customary barriers to and limits on their capacity to capture and compel labour. The article supports 
this argument through the analysis of contests between Los Angeles-based recording artists and record 
companies over the California and federal laws that govern their political-economic relationships. These 
struggles reveal a pattern of attempts by record companies to overcome or change laws that limit their 
power in the employment relation. The article suggests that as contractual norms change under 
digitalization, familiar political dynamics continue to characterize the relationships between recording 
artists and the companies that depend on their labor.  
[W]hen a statesman looks coolly on, with his arms across, or takes it into his head, that it is not his 
business to interpose, the prices of the dexterous workman will rise.’ (James Steuart, 1767, quoted 
in Perelman, 2000: 155) 
Introduction 
Binding, long-term employment contracts for creative labour (or ‘talent’, in industry 
jargon) are important to the recording industry and have featured in legislative and 
courtroom battles between recording artists and record companies for decades. Today, 
points of contractual friction are shifting as artists and companies explore new 
contracting conventions in response to challenges stemming from digitalization and the 
unauthorized distribution of music via the Internet. Where record companies and 
recording artists often argued before lawmakers and judges over the allowable duration 
of their contracts, they are increasingly concerned with negotiating the contract’s 
coverage of formerly off-limits recording artist activities such as touring and 
merchandising. Drawing mainly on legislative and judicial documents and trade journal 
reportage, this article examines ongoing changes in contracting conventions. It traces 
abstract 
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late 20th century contests over laws that governed recording contracts, and considers the 
‘360 deal’, one of the main contractual innovations emerging in response to the recent 
destabilisation of the recording industry. The article links the political-economic logics 
of contracting under the old and emergent regimes through the lens of ‘primitive 
accumulation’, a Marxian concept that highlights capitalists’ ongoing drive to overcome 
legal and/or traditional limits to the extension of the capital relation (De Angelis, 2004, 
2001; Bonefeld, 2001; Midnight Notes Collective, 1990; Perelman, 2000). It argues that 
even in the contemporary context of labour’s increasing casualisation, the impetus of 
cultural capitalists toward contractual capture and control of valuable talent exemplifies 
the usefulness of the ‘primitive accumulation’ perspective in the analysis of work and 
employment. 
Option contracts, rules, and the ‘360 deal’  
Unsure of new artists’ potential value, record companies typically require new artists to 
sign open-ended ‘option’ contracts. Option contracts give companies the exclusive right 
periodically to renew or end the employment; if an artist under contract becomes (or 
shows promise to become) profitable, the company will typically exercise its option(s) 
to continue the relationship, if not, they can ‘drop’ the artist. Option contracts 
essentially guarantee employer control of the artist’s creative labour and products on an 
exclusive and assignable basis for as long as the employer chooses to exercise it; artists 
under such contracts face severe penalties for breach. The benefit to employers of this 
kind of control is a substantial legal claim on the forms of income that can be generated 
from the marketing of the artist’s work and likeness which, conversely, obligates the 
company to very little. Moreover, most new artists sign their first contracts from 
positions of bargaining weakness, as relative unknowns. While artists may be able to 
renegotiate for better terms as they become more successful, these contracts prevent 
them from offering their talents to other bidders on an open market, thus keeping their 
costs to their initial employer artificially low.1  
Despite the option contract’s general auspiciousness for employers, companies making 
use of it sometimes encounter obstacles or limits to the full exploitation of the 
contract’s advantages. Among the impediments to the maximisation of the option 
contract are labour and bankruptcy law, which preserve some rights for artists in their 
status as employees by setting limits on what can be included in the contract. Employers 
of valuable talent have long chafed against the legal obstacles and limits posed by these 
forms of law; their legislative activities evince a pattern of attempts to change law in 
order to reduce or remove these impediments.  
As a result largely of digitalization and file-sharing, however, recording artist 
contracting is taking place in a business environment that is extremely different from 
the one in which these longstanding conventions developed. In particular, record sales 
have begun to lose their pride of economic place as the ‘hole in the universe’ rent by 
__________ 
1 The logic of the long-term option contract is so favourable to entertainment-industrial stability, in 
fact, that some contemporary Hollywood observers are suggesting the film industry ought to revisit 
some of the legal labour practices of the system that were tossed out along with the system’s many 
illegal aspects (Moore, 2009). 
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file-sharing threatens record industry revenues (Pareles, 2010: AR1).2 One way around 
this problem has been the development of the ‘360 (degree) deal’, so named because it 
enables the company to ‘participate’ in virtually all artist activities and revenue streams, 
including such formerly off-limits areas as merchandise and touring (Leyshon et al., 
2005). With the 360 deal comes a shift of attention and emphasis from the 
public/legislative to the private/contractual arena. The RIAA’s member companies are 
developing a new contractual form in which terms that are governed by law (such as 
duration) concede priority to terms that spell out the number and kinds of activities that 
the contract covers. However, not all has changed: a ‘primitive accumulation’ analysis 
highlights crucial continuities between the fading and emerging regimes. Under the 360 
deal, this analysis suggests, ‘unconscionable’ conditions of indentured or even 
involuntary servitude that some analysts find codified in the recording contract 
(Anorga, 2002; Gardner, 2006; Brereton, 2009), ‘in which the victim is forced to 
work…by use or threat of coercion through law or legal process’ (United States v. 
Kozminski, 1988), appear to become more rather than less of an issue in the record 
industry. 
Primitive accumulation 
In both the royalty-driven, individual unit sales era and the internet-destabilised, still-
working-on-a-stable-business-model era, record companies use recording contracts to 
secure control over certain of the recording artists’ activities. They do this by requiring 
that artists (voluntarily) make themselves contractually vulnerable – legally unable to 
say ‘no’ without penalty – to certain kinds of demands.3 Many of the earlier era’s 
demands had to do with how long a successful artist could be held to a relatively narrow 
contract; many such demands were limited by forms of law that endowed employees 
with some countervailing powers and rights. Today’s demands increasingly concern the 
breadth of the range of artist activities in which a company may ‘participate’ (by 
claiming some portion of revenue related to given activities and/or some rights of 
decision-making power over them); legal limits have become less important in 
determining which activities can be contracted for.4 In both cases the dynamic at issue 
is the extension of employer power, whether across greater lengths of time or over a 
wider range of activities. In each case, this analysis argues, extension requires the 
transcendence of former (legal or customary) limitations or obstacles to increased 
employer power, of which the obvious corollary is increased employee vulnerability. 
Employer efforts to increase employer power and worker vulnerability are not new; the 
efforts of record companies under both regimes have an illuminating analogue in a 
phenomenon first called ‘primitive accumulation’ by Marx’ translators, and recently 
elaborated in Marxist political theory and economic history. For Marx, capital is not a 
__________ 
2 File sharing is far from the only culprit in the music industry’s crisis of profitability (Leyshon et al., 
2005; Peitz and Waelbroeck, 2004). 
3 The question of substantive vs. formal voluntariness is beyond the scope of this paper. For an 
illuminating treatment see Macpherson (1973). 
4 Of course, recording contracts could not legally require artists to do anything illegal; such a contract 
would be invalid. 
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thing (e.g., Adam Smith’s ‘stock’) but a relation: the separation of people from direct 
access to the means of subsistence and production. This separation renders some people 
– those who have not already accumulated or inherited wealth – dependent on markets 
in which they must sell their labour and, with their money wages, purchase what they 
need to survive. Primitive accumulation has conventionally been understood to describe 
a historical period when nascent or proto capitalists advanced the preconditions for 
capitalist development through the enclosure of common lands. Enclosures curtailed 
people’s rights and access, for example, to land on which they could grow food for 
themselves, increasing the pressure on them to buy rather than grow what they needed, 
and to undertake paid work to earn the necessary wages.  
Recent reinterpretations of Marx’ writing, however, suggests the concept plays a much 
more central and ongoing role in economic life. Massimo De Angelis argues for a 
broadening of primitive accumulation to include all efforts by capital – personified by 
its owners and their agents – to transcend various limits and barriers to the extension of 
capital’s relation of separation. As a political-theoretical category, De Angelis writes, 
primitive accumulation ‘define[s] a strategic terrain among social forces’ not locked in 
the past (2001: 68). The logic of primitive accumulation is starkly visible, for example, 
in present-day efforts to privatise public utilities such as water and water services. 
Public utilities prioritise people’s rights and access to necessary means of life, 
demarcating areas of life protected from (excessive) commodification; their 
privatisation represents capital’s transcendence of prior limits on the penetration of 
markets into hitherto protected (non- or less-marketised) areas of life. 
A ‘social common’ 
The privatisation of water is an easily legible example because it so clearly rehearses 
the spectacular enclosures of the early period at the same time as it exemplifies the 
continuous nature of primitive accumulation in the modern world. Axiomatically 
speaking, in a fully marketised society (an impossibility in all but the most extreme 
contractarian fulminations), you have no right to anything you have not purchased. The 
maximal proliferation of markets in drinking water depends on the elimination of non-
market or traditional or human rights to water. Without a right to clean water, thirsty 
people are at the mercy of those who hold title. Alongside plainly visible enclosable 
commons like clean water is a less legible but equally important ‘social common’ which 
‘sets a limit to the extension, the scale’ of the capital relation in everyday life (De 
Angelis, 2001: 18). According to De Angelis, ‘socio-economic rights and entitlements’ 
are bulwarks (often resulting from ‘past battles’) that protect people’s standard of life, 
as do rights to water their ability to live. ‘State institutions’, he writes, ‘have developed 
and attempted to accommodate many of these rights and entitlements with the priorities 
of a capitalist system. The entitlements and rights guaranteed by the post-war welfare 
state for example, can be understood as the institutionalisation in particular forms of 
social commons’ (De Angelis, 2001: 19).5 ‘A classic example’, De Angelis writes, ‘is 
__________ 
5 De Angelis notes that this dynamic is captured in Polanyi’s account of the social-protective ‘double 
movement’: 
[O]n one side, there is the historical movement of the market, a movement that has no inherent 
limits and that therefore threatens society’s very existence. On the other, there is society’s 
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the body of rights, provisions and entitlements universally guaranteed by the welfare 
state in spheres such as health, unemployment benefits, education, and pensions” (2004: 
80). These serve as limits to the extension of the capital relation, or marketisation, 
because they underwrite people’s capacity to say “no” to degrees of domination and 
exploitation considered excessive by the social movements and policymakers 
responsible for them. 
The rights and entitlements embedded in the forms of labour- and debtor-protective 
legislation attacked by the RIAA in the cases I recount below are not identical with 
those rights to resources and public wealth named by De Angelis above. I nominate 
them, however, as an intermediary form that ought to be considered as part of the social 
common because they share with those rights the practical function of limiting the 
power of employers to compel people in and to work. The barriers to market influence 
created by the “rights and entitlements” De Angelis names are not impermeable; these 
rights and entitlements can be more or less influenced by markets and yet still have 
incrementally egalitarian effects. In the U.S., for example, the quality of ‘public’ 
primary and secondary education your children can expect is determined to an 
enormous degree by the property taxes collected in your neighbourhood; market values 
of homes thus play a role in determining how much public money is directed to schools 
in different neighbourhoods (Barry, 2005: 67-68). No progressive would deny, 
however, that full marketisation of education would pose a disastrous advance from this 
partial market influence. However imperfectly, publicly-funded education mitigates the 
influence of markets on the distribution and quality of education. Similarly, labour-
protective legislation attenuates the power of markets to set the terms of employment, 
without creating totally non-market social spaces. 
The rules of contract duration, minimum compensation, and bankruptcy protection 
attacked by the RIAA help(ed) protect working people from being held under contract 
by a single employer, guaranteeing them the limited but real right periodically to take 
advantage of competition between employers for their services or to leave the 
employment altogether. These rules put limits on employers’ market power without 
rendering affected working people invulnerable to market power. In each case, where 
the record company-recording artist relationship met certain conditions, the rule could 
intervene and open an exit for the artist, even when the artist had voluntarily agreed to 
unfavorable terms. In each case, the RIAA sought to place obstacles in front of these 
exits, in order to make it easier to keep valuable artists under contract for as long as 
could be desirable. All three of these efforts are better understood in the context of the 
significant autonomy enjoyed by successful, late 20th century recording artists. 
__________ 
propensity to defend itself, and therefore to create institutions for its own protection. In Polanyi’s 
terms, the continuous element of Marx’s primitive accumulation could be identified as those social 
processes or sets of strategies aimed at dismantling those institutions that protect society from the 
market. (De Angelis, 2004: 69) 
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Recording artist autonomy 
Part of the reason why record companies work so hard to establish control over the 
labour and output of recording artists is the unusually high degree of autonomy 
typically enjoyed by many recording artists. The extraordinary position of recording 
artists relative to other forms of talent in film, television, publishing and other popular 
media has at least two medium-specific explanations.6 First, and most significantly for 
the present discussion, recording artists’ unusual autonomy is rooted in their 
historically-developed ability to derive significant incomes from activities not covered 
by their recording contracts. This pattern emerged in an exemplary form among mid-
20th century U.S. swing bands. As Jason Toynbee writes, these touring ensembles, like 
the rock’n’roll and rock groups that followed them, ‘were able to sell their services 
directly to several buyers’ – of live as well as recording studio performances – “and so 
avoid dependence on any single one” (Toynbee, 2003: 44). This self-sufficiency has 
shaped the terms of record deals for many popular music performers. It has become 
institutionalised and can limit record companies’ capacity to control the labour of their 
artists. (As I show below, this theme appears in record companies’ arguments for laws 
that would increase their leverage in contractual relationships with performers.) Second, 
the market value of a popular musician can rest to an unusual degree in the public’s 
perception of the artist as autonomous. This principle has long been understood to 
operate primarily in jazz, folk, blues, and rock cultures, where evidence of an act’s 
authenticity is important to fans’ monetizable investments (Frith, 1981; Keightley, 
2001), although recent scholarship has shown that this principle is also important in 
other genre cultures (Leach, 2001; Stahl, 2002; Tregoning, 2004). 
The combination of these factors positions many recording artists at what might be 
called a frontier of employee control and autonomy in market society. Recording 
contracts are contracts for employment, but these artist-workers’ autonomy seems to 
call that status into question, making them appear more like independent contractors. 
Employment presumes dependence, but recording artists are already quite independent. 
Employment law limits employees’ vulnerability to employer fiat; the unusual 
independence of recording artists is (or rather was – see section 4, below) further 
consolidated, supported and protected by such law. The recording artist’s significant 
degrees of independence often (but not always) translate into significant degrees of 
autonomy in their contractual employment,7 and are often perceived by their employing 
record company firms as a threat to the stability and profitability of their business. If the 
profitability of the recording industry depends in large part on the power of record 
companies to capture, elicit, and control the ‘recording services’ (and resulting 
‘phonorecords’) named in recording contracts, then recording artists’ capacity to avoid, 
thwart, or mitigate record companies’ power of capture and control constitutes the 
__________ 
6 Recording artists’ asserted ownership of copyright in their sound recordings may constitute an 
additional explanation of their autonomy. See Nimmer and Menell, 2001; Stahl, 2008.  
7 The case of George Michael (Panayiotou v. Sony Music Entertainment (UK) Ltd., 1994) illustrates 
the nonidentity of independence and autonomy. When blockbuster artist Michael began to change 
musical directions, Sony, he charged, refused to promote a new album reflecting his emerging 
(autonomous) musical vision, believing that fans would not accept it. Michael lost a subsequent suit 
to be released from his contract (Soocher, 1999: 43-63). 
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degree to which (companies fear) artists can hold companies at ransom over various 
contractual issues’. 
In the latter decades of the 20th century, in response to real and perceived threats to their 
power to capture and control recording artist labour, the major record companies (to 
whom many of the most successful artists were under contract) sought to set limits on 
the autonomy of their artists. Through the RIAA, the major record companies pursued, 
resisted, and sometimes obtained significant changes to law that could or would alter 
the bargaining ‘playing field’. Artists, with less success, have struggled against and also 
pursued legislation. The lion’s share of these changes has benefited record companies 
by expanding their power to command recording artists’ labour.  
Legislative contests 
1979-87: The ‘Olivia Newton-John problem’ and California’s ‘seven year’ rule 
The late 20th century era of record label-recording artist legislative battles was initiated 
by the RIAA following the resolution of a 1979 court contest between the singer Olivia 
Newton-John and her record label, MCA Records. The singer had given notice of her 
intention to stop recording under their 1975 contract, and MCA, who had been reaping 
significant profits from the deal, sought to induce her to keep recording for them (or at 
least inhibit her from competing with them) by preventing her from recording for any 
other record company. Superficially, the decision in the case favoured MCA: the 
appellate court approved and enforced an injunction to prevent the artist working for 
any other record label for the two-year remainder of the term of her contract with MCA. 
However, when the dust settled it was clear that the interests of Olivia Newton-John 
(and of recording artists as a group) had been better served by the decision than those of 
MCA (and of the other major record labels). This discovery led to the RIAA’s 
successful effort to change California labour law to its advantage. 
At both the lower and appellate levels, the Olivia Newton-John case involved the 
interpretation of a century-old California law that limited the duration of employment 
contracts to seven years: both courts held that no injunction could extend past that law’s 
seven year limit. This finding alerted artists to an interesting fact: the only penalty to 
which an artist in breach of contract could be subject was a period of recording studio 
idleness that would end on the seventh anniversary of the artist’s contract. For artists 
who could earn income by touring or appearing in films, for example, such idleness 
might not pose a compelling hardship. Moreover, this interpretation seemed to promise 
an immediate way out for artists under contracts that had already exceeded seven 
years.8 ‘The effect of the Newton-John decision upon the recording industry’, Robert 
Steinberg noted already in 1981, ‘has been tremendous’ (1981: 104). It demonstrated to 
the industry that a contract with a fixed duration weakens the employer’s bargaining 
__________ 
8 See Melissa Manchester v. Arista Records (1981). 
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position, and spurred executives, attorneys and lobbyists to create a way around this 
newly discovered hazard.9 
In response, the RIAA set out to eliminate ‘seven year rule’ protection for recording 
artists. In 1985, acting explicitly on the association’s behalf, California state senator 
Ralph Dills (D-Montebello) introduced a bill to achieve that end. The bill foundered in 
various forms until, two years on, Dills finally introduced a version that appeared less 
coercive than earlier versions. Rather than extending the duration limit for all California 
workers for an additional number of years, this version specified that a person hired to 
produce ‘phonorecords’ could still leave the employment at the old seven year mark, 
but only if she had produced all the albums that could contractually have been required 
under the contract. If the departing artist had not fulfilled all possible album options set 
out in the contract she would be vulnerable for damages on ‘lost profits’ on those 
uncompleted albums. Thus, while the power of injunction expired at the seventh 
anniversary, the new law created a right for the company to demand damages of 
sufficient magnitude to keep the artist under contract. This version passed in 1987.  
The arguments over the various versions of the bill are fascinating and I treat them in 
detail elsewhere (Stahl, 2010, forthcoming). Here, I want only to highlight some of the 
main themes in the RIAA’s 1985 arguments for the change. ‘[C]urrent law in 
California’, the association claimed, ‘has been used as a weapon by prominent, highly 
successful recording artists.’ By invoking the seven year rule, recording artists could 
‘force their record company employer/financiers into renegotiating contracts under 
circumstances in which the record company is not even sure it will get the benefit of the 
new bargain.’ If the record companies did not submit, they argued, ‘the alternative to 
renegotiation is that the artist will sit out the balance of his contract term with 
impunity.’ The RIAA argued that the artist’s bargaining power, moreover, is unfairly 
enhanced ‘because he can and does earn substantial sums from ‘live’ entertainment 
tours and personal concert appearances’, reducing the artist’s dependence on the 
recording agreement for income. These ‘inequities’, they argued, would be corrected by 
Dills’ bill (Gang et al., 1985: 4). The bill passed, the ‘Olivia Newton-John problem’ 
(Passman, 2006: 101) was solved, and through their vulnerability to damages for 
records that could contractually be required (whether or not the options are ever 
exercised by the company), recording artists may be kept under contract for indefinite 
periods. 
1992-3: Minimum compensation and negative injunctions 
The seven year rule provides the employer with the remedy of an injunction against the 
employee within the seven year limit. The 1987 damages provisions, opponents to the 
carve-out argued, effectively extend the injunctive power beyond that limit.10 However, 
__________ 
9 Following the 1979 Newton-John case were those Donna Summer (1980), Melissa Manchester 
(1981), Sammy Hagar (1981), and Tom Scholz of Boston (1984) all sought relief with varying 
degrees of success. See McLane and Wong (1999). 
10 Artist attorney Jay Cooper argued before a March, 19, 2002 hearing of the California State Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary that artist lawsuits ‘cost millions of dollars today, and very few artists in 
this world can afford those things, and they have to settle, they eventually have to cave, because…the 
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in order to be able successfully to petition a California court for an injunction against a 
non-performing employee, the employer must pass a simple test. The employer must 
have guaranteed and paid compensation at or above a minimum dollar amount set by a 
1919 law. If they have not done this, they cannot obtain an injunction, no matter the 
behavior of the artist. In 1992, recording artist advocates sought to update that figure to 
an amount reflecting seven decades’ worth of inflation. Their efforts, though partially 
successful, actually ended up weakening a central aspect of the law’s public policy. 
Injunctions against employees were prohibited in California until 1919, when the 
Legislature sought to grant employers more power to induce employee performance and 
found a precedent in the 19th century case of a concert promoter stymied by a 
recalcitrant singing star (Lumley v. Wagner, 1852). However, in recognition of the 
extreme nature of injunction’s power of compulsion, the Legislature set a strict 
condition on their issuance: the worker had to have been guaranteed and paid no less 
than $6000 per year under the contract (California Civil Code, Section 3423). At the 
time, that sum – about five times the average annual wage for a working American – 
was thought to demonstrate both the extraordinary value of the performer to the 
employer and the good faith of the employer, thereby establishing the case for the 
injunction. The value of this sum has evaporated through inflation; the law has since 
been interpreted as an assignment of a ‘counterweight’ to the employer’s ability to 
(otherwise costlessly) restrain a performer from performing for any other employer 
(Lucas, 1985: 1073). In the 1960s, 70s and 80s, a handful of cases (including MCA v. 
Newton-John) interpreted the law. In cases involving the comedian Redd Foxx (1966) 
and the singer Teena Marie (1984), the performers were released from their contracts 
because their record companies had neither guaranteed nor paid the statutory (and 
paltry) minimum of $6000.  
In 1992 California State Senator Henry Mello put forward a bill that would update the 
minimum compensation law in line with 70 years of inflation. Mello’s bill replaced the 
$6000 figure with $50,00011 and passed in both houses without a single ‘no’ vote. 
Almost immediately an alarmed RIAA contacted the legislature, arguing that the new 
minimum would have a ‘severe’, potentially ‘destructive’ effect on the industry (Lopez, 
1993). Mello then convened a working group that came up with new legislation that 
was passed in 1993. The new legislation raised the 1919 figure to $9000 in the first year 
of the contract, $12,000 in the second, progressing to $45,000 in the seventh year. The 
reduction in the revised 1993 bill of 1992’s $50,000 minimum – particularly 
pronounced in the first years of a contract – was very well received by smaller firms. 
‘This is the greatest thing for a small record company’, an independent music executive 
told Billboard, ‘because it protects us against being outbid’, as can happen once a small 
record company’s artists become successful and attractive to bigger firms (Fitzpatrick, 
1993: 23).  
__________ 
threat of a lawsuit is almost the same as an injunction’ (audio recording on file at the California State 
Archive, Sacramento). 
11 While five times the average annual wage of a working American in 1992 was $100,000, the 
rationale of the BHBA was that 1919’s $6000 were worth $47,000 in 1992, and that $50,000 would 
sufficiently increase the ‘counterweight’ against the power to enjoin an employee to restore the teeth 
to the 1919 law. 
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However, the new law contravened a public policy rationale expressed by the courts in 
the earlier cases. The law’s original rationale is protective, it denies employers access to 
an injunction unless the employee has been well paid up to the moment of 
disagreement. In the 1960s record companies began inserting a new kind of option 
clause in their contracts which gave them the option to make (or make up) the minimum 
payment in response to an artist’s announcement of his or her intention to stop 
performing under the contract. The Teena Marie court’s opinion oozes with disdain for 
this practice and finds that it violates the law. If this new form of option is found to be 
legal, that court wrote, 
the company may wait until the last possible moment to exercise its option. Motown and Jobete 
filed suit against Teena Marie in August 1982 but waited until September 1982 to exercise the 
option clauses. The request for a preliminary injunction was filed two months later. Thus, the 
companies purchased an insurance policy worth a considerable sum [Motown’s profits on Teena 
Marie’s recordings were quite high] for a minimal premium just prior to the time they could be 
fairly certain a loss would occur. If the option clause [could be found to] meet[] the statutory 
requirement of minimum compensation, [then] the company can buy its insurance policy on the 
courthouse steps on its way to seek an injunction. (Motown Record Corporation v. Tina Marie 
Brockert, 1984) 
‘Indeed’, the court continued, ‘the company may be able to buy its insurance policy 
after the “accident” has occurred; that is, after the artist has already signed and recorded 
with another company’ (Motown Record Corporation v. Tina Marie Brockert, 1984). 
The 1993 law, however, allows precisely this ‘courthouse steps’ insurance policy. As 
Billboard reported,  
the new bill allows a company to retain an artist even if the company does not meet the minimum 
compensation rate – as long as it agrees to pay 10 times the difference of the original 
compensation. For example, if an artist is paid only $ 7,000 on a one-year contract, which is $ 
2,000 below the minimum, the company may keep the artist by paying $ 20,000. (Fitzpatrick, 
1993: 23) 
The company, in other words, may buy the right to enjoin the artist, if the artist attracts 
attention from another company, even if they’ve paid the artist nothing up until that 
time. The very strategy scorned and invalidated by the Teena Marie court as 
contravening the law’s founding logic became fundamental to the operation of the law, 
which underwrites the (albeit more expensive) ‘courthouse steps’ insurance policy. 
Guaranteed and paid minimum compensation is no a longer necessary precondition for 
an injunction, as long as the original company is willing to cough up a larger amount of 
money to obtain the injunction and thereby prevent the artist from accepting other bids.  
1998: Bankruptcy and the rejection of contracts 
In the mid- to late 1990s, a handful of recording artists – notably including African-
American performers Run-DMC (1993), TLC (1995), and Toni Braxton (1998) – 
sought bankruptcy protection. The latter’s filing was particularly big news because at 
the time her hit song ‘Unbreak My Heart’ ‘was still generating countless radio royalties’ 
(De Lisle, 2000: 72). One feature of a successful bankruptcy petition is the release of 
the petitioner from obligations known as ‘executory contracts’, that is, contracts that 
require the performance (‘execution’) of some specified action in the future. Debt is one 
such contract but there are many others, including the recording contract (Brewer, 2003: 
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588). Shortly after Braxton’s bankruptcy filing, the RIAA attempted to change pending 
federal legislation (then being pushed by credit card companies) in order to make it 
more difficult for recording artists to declare bankruptcy and void their recording 
contracts. This effort was rebuffed, and the 1998 legislation failed. However, the 
recording industry’s position – along with those of the consumer credit industries – was 
strengthened when sweeping bankruptcy reform legislation was passed several years 
later.  
The important place of bankruptcy provisions in US law was first recognised in Article 
1, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution; despite this recognition, it was not until 1898 that 
bankruptcy law became a permanent feature of US law (Landry and Mardis, 2006: 94). 
The first major reform of the law took place in 1978, which, according to Robert 
Landry and Nancy Mardis ‘did not alter the fundamental policy [that had long been] in 
favor of debtors’ (2006: 94). For most of its history US bankruptcy law placed a 
significant burden on creditors to demonstrate that individuals seeking bankruptcy 
protection were doing so ‘for reasons other than financial distress’ (Pritchard, 1998: 8). 
The same burden to show ‘bad faith’ and/or ‘substantive abuse’ applied to record 
companies trying to enforce their contracts by contesting artist bankruptcy claims. Only 
a very small percentage of recording artists turn to bankruptcy; trying to escape a 
contract through the declaration of bankruptcy ‘is risky’, write MacLane and Wong, 
‘because there is no guarantee that the bankruptcy court will reject the contract in 
question’ (1999: 27). In the wake of the successful bankruptcy gambles of Braxton, 
TLC, and Run-DMC, the credit card companies’ legislative push offered the RIAA an 
opportunity to put obstacles in the way of artist bankruptcy. 
In May of 1998, just a few months after Braxton’s January bankruptcy filing, the RIAA 
pushed Representative Bill McCollum, a Republican from Florida’s entertainment 
industry-dominated city of Orlando, to insert a provision into the pending bankruptcy 
reform legislation that would demand a higher standard of court scrutiny for recording 
artist filings than for those of any other kind of person.12 A favorable Chapter 7 
bankruptcy judgment empowers a court-appointed trustee to ‘reject’ executory contracts 
if it appears that doing so will facilitate a person’s economic rehabilitation (Brewer, 
2003: 589). In asking McCollum and other representatives to support the provision, the 
RIAA argued that artists were increasingly using the bankruptcy code’s Chapter 7 
language to escape from their recording contracts. ‘Unscrupulous lawyers’, acting on 
behalf of recording artists, argued RIAA president and CEO Hilary Rosen, ‘are 
extorting record labels into rewriting existing record contracts – ones they freely 
entered for their clients – by threatening bankruptcy’ (Stern, 1998: 6). 
The RIAA advanced legislation that would alter the ‘playing field’ in their favour. They 
induced McCollum to insert their proposed language into the pending bankruptcy 
reform legislation after the bill had been discussed, ‘without benefit of debate at the 
subcommittee and committee level’ (Holland, 1998). Union officials discovered the new 
__________ 
12 Justin Pritchard noted that ‘[s]ince 1995, McCollum has received $3,000 from the RIAA political 
action committee, campaign records show. House Judiciary Committee members overall received 
$8,700 from the RIAA’s PAC during the 1997-98 election cycle, including $1,000 contributed to 
McCollum’ (1998: 8). 
ephemera 10(3/4): 337-356 Primitive accumulation, the social common… 
articles  Stahl 
348 
language prior to its coming up for a vote. When made public, the legislation led to an 
outcry from artists and their professional and legislative allies. The RIAA (and, in this 
case, the sponsoring lawmaker) then contended the legislation was technical rather than 
substantive. The association insisted ‘that the legislation is not seeking a “special 
interest” exemption as its opponents are claiming, but instead is trying to close a 
loophole in current law’ (Seelye, 1998: A18). The RIAA provided no evidence that any 
of the recent bankruptcies had been pursued in bad faith, and little that any more than 
the handful of cases mentioned above had actually been threatened or taken place. In 
declining to document the scope of the problem, an RIAA lobbyist said ‘I simply can 
tell you based on personal conversations that there’s a problem that should be 
addressed’ (Pritchard, 1998: 8). McCollum acknowledged ‘I don’t recall the number 
precisely, but it strikes me that there’s three or four cases they cited to me’ (Pritchard, 
1998: 8). Thus, while observers acknowledged the likelihood that recording artists’ 
bankruptcies were driven by artists’ desires for substantive re-negotiations, they also 
looked sceptically on the RIAA’s unwillingness or inability to substantiate its own 
claims. 
Finally, concerned senators sent the RIAA to recording artist representatives to hammer 
out a compromise and ‘craft substitute language that does not specifically mention 
recording artists’ (Holland, 1998: 12). The two groups agreed on language suggesting 
somewhat toothlessly that bankruptcy judges may consider ‘whether an individual 
debtor seeks to reject a personal services contract and the financial need for such 
rejection as sought by the debtor’ (Holland, 1998: 12). 
The bankruptcy reform legislation that ultimately passed (the Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005) made it more difficult for most 
Americans to pursue bankruptcy protection, though it contained no language pertaining 
solely to recording artists. By introducing means-testing and by shifting more of the 
burden of proof away from creditors and onto individuals seeking bankruptcy 
protection, the new legislation made it much more difficult for bankruptcy courts to 
excuse individuals from their financial obligations (Landry and Mardis, 2006). 
Atavism at the threshold of digitalization? 
Primitive accumulation and protective legislation 
California’s seven year rule and its requirement of minimum compensation as a 
precondition of injunction, and federal bankruptcy law’s low pre-2005 threshold for 
voiding executory contracts, established and enforced limits on record companies’ 
power over recording artists’ labour. In order for record companies to maintain and 
advance their stability and profitability during turbulent times, the RIAA argued, 
recording artists had to be constrained in their capacity to invoke these legal limitations 
of employer power. I have suggested that the efforts of this group of employers to 
extend their control over their artists bears an obverse, corollary dimension: the 
ratcheting up of employer control requires and produces increased employee 
vulnerability. This is the salience of the primitive accumulation analysis: when capital 
encounters an obstacle or a limit it often works aggressively to overcome it; the limit’s 
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transcendence often requires and results in the erosion of the employee’s political 
position. 
The record industry’s continued dependence on the long-term option contract might 
seem to contradict the 21st century’s prevailing logics of digitalization and employment 
casualisation. In digitalization’s brave new world of ‘convergent media’ and ‘liquid 
life’ (Deuze, 2007) contractual labour subordination seems as obsolete as the mortal 
coils of magnetic tape and vinyl grooves recently shuffled off by the record industry. It 
is tempting to understand record companies’ legal paroxysms over capture and control, 
after Ernst Bloch and Frederic Jameson, as an ironic example of the ‘simultaneity of the 
non-simultaneous’, the ‘the coexistence of realities from radically different moments of 
history[, of] peasant fields with the Krupp factories or the Ford plant in the distance’ 
(Jameson, 1991: 307 (drawing on Ernst Bloch)). Yet the rigid enforcement powers on 
which companies still depend for their control of labour are not only not inimical to 
corporate flexibility, they are central to it. ‘Casual’ is an attribute of the job and not the 
worker. As Guy Standing writes, prison labour is ‘the most casual form of all, in that 
the worker has no rights, cannot bargain, and can be made to do as much labour as 
somebody sees fit’ (2010: 71). The option contract is a one-way arrangement of 
obligation: employees are locked in, employers are free to exit at any time.13 Employer 
efforts at extending the capacity to capture, elicit, and control creative labour through 
primitive accumulation are consistent with casualisation in that they push past prior 
public policy or traditional limits on marketisation, on capital’s freedom and expansion. 
When successful, such efforts diminish impediments that might otherwise constrain 
employer fiat. 
When the RIAA pushes state and federal legislators to tilt the record industry ‘playing 
field’ in their favour, they are engaging the state in a project of primitive accumulation 
through the latter’s power to impose what Marx called ‘[d]irect extra-economic force’ 
(De Angelis, 2004: 67). The argument here is not about contrasting abstract or idealised 
states of ‘freedom’ and ‘unfreedom’ but about showing, with Michael Perelman, how 
employers and politicians incrementally adjust the rights of working people in different 
ways, at different times, in response to different constellations of forces and priorities. 
The constraining of recording artists’ liberty by the restriction of their access to a 
market for their labour (case A), and by making it more difficult for them to pursue 
bankruptcy relief (case C), began ‘with the identification [by capital] of a concrete limit 
and the deployment of strategies for its transcendence’ (De Angelis, 2004: 72). Such 
‘strategies also target any given balance of power among classes that constitutes…a 
resistance against the further process of capitalist accumulation’ (De Angelis, 2004: 70). 
The legalisation of the ‘courthouse steps’ option to justify an injunction in the absence 
of actual minimum compensation (case B) was a response to the resistant assertion of a 
new limit, in the form of a required $50,000 annual payment to artists to justify 
injunction.  
__________ 
13 This standard industry deal framework is discussed in exhaustive detail in a number of recording 
industry reference works, including Passman (2006). Passman, a respected entertainment industry 
attorney, writes ‘DON’T BE FOOLED! OPTIONS ARE NEVER GOOD FOR YOU!! They only 
mean you’ll get dropped if you’re not worth the price, or you’ll get too little if you’re a smash. So 
repeat after me: “OPTIONS ARE NEVER GOOD FOR ME!!!”’(2006: 99, emphasis original). 
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The 360 deal and the extension of the scope of the contract 
A ‘hole in the universe’ cannot simply be plugged. As the record industry scrambles to 
reproduce itself around file-sharing, how are these relations changing? Music industry 
players and observers have proposed numerous models and strategies following the 
disruption of the CD-sales-based business model. Among the main innovations along 
these lines is the 360 deal. ‘360’ describes a situation in which the artist is contractually 
surrounded by corporate toll gates through which pass most or all artist revenues – not 
just record royalties – now subject to record company ‘participation’. In fact, in many 
such agreements, companies not only gain significant percentages of formerly 
inaccessible streams of revenue, but also decision-making power over those activities.14 
‘By expanding the scope of their relationships with artists’, notes Sara Karubian, ‘labels 
are shifting their focus from trying to reverse the trend of declining CD sales to 
compensating for the decreased sales by participating in more profitable arenas’ (2009: 
422). This language of an expanded scope immediately suggests the identification by 
record industry capital ‘of a concrete limit and the deployment of strategies for its 
transcendence’ (De Angelis, 2004: 72). However, with the 360 deal, it is strategies of 
class power more than state power that are involved, reshaping the content rather than 
the legal conditions of the long-term talent option contract. The main target of this force 
is the longstanding barrier between artists’ record royalty income (customarily claimed 
by the record company) and artists’ traditionally independence-sustaining revenues 
from live performance, licensing of music (including to television and film producers, 
video game companies, advertisers), and merchandise (from tour t-shirts to deals with 
retailers like Hot Topic).  
There are numerous practical advantages to both record companies and artists to 
engaging on these terms: not only are record companies – increasingly recreating 
themselves as what Edgar Bronfman Jr. calls ‘music based content companies’ (quoted 
in Schultz, 2009: 700) or what James McQuivey calls ‘music talent managers’ (quoted 
in Basch, 2008: E1) – invested in music marketing in a range of new and profitable 
venues, able to replace revenue lost to declining sales and reposition themselves better 
to take advantage of unforeseen licensing or marketing opportunities. New recording 
artists themselves may enjoy lowered pressure to produce hits and thus more time to 
develop their act and fan base, as well as a larger relative royalty percentage (Leeds, 
2007); established artists can trade some relatively calculable profit for ‘a measure of 
financial certainty’ (Pearlstein, 2008: D1) as they shift some risk onto a big company 
like concert promoter Live Nation.  
Observers disagree regarding the degree to which 360 deals might be becoming the new 
normal.15 In any case, according to Karubian, it appears clear that ‘the bargaining power 
dynamic remains relatively consistent in the shift from traditional to 360 deals’ (2009: 
__________ 
14 As is the case with Nickelback’s deal with Live Nation (Gallo, 2008: 1). 
15 Some observers suggest the form is ‘used by all the major record labels’ (Leeds, 2007), that ‘it’s 
everywhere’ (producer Josh Abraham, quoted in Leeds, 2007). One record company president said 
that he didn’t ‘think there’s a deal being made today where the 360 model doesn’t come up’ 
(Morrissey, 2007). Others suggest that ‘those types of contract are still far from the norm’ (Sisario, 
2009: C1). 
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442). In fact, her analysis indicates incremental gains in employer leverage as ‘labels 
have used their publicised crisis to their advantage in negotiating terms with artists’, 
appearing ‘justified in their claims that they need to dip into non-recording revenues 
when they insist that their full reliance on the recorded music business will lead them to 
extinction’ (2009: 443). Against this, Karubian notes that ‘many artists and their 
advocates worry that companies are invading and planting their flags in territories 
traditionally belonging to artists’ (2009: 443). Again, Karubian’s language points to the 
usefulness of a primitive accumulation analysis for understanding struggles over the 
boundaries to maximal marketisation of terrains of employment set by labour and 
finance law. 
Michael Perelman’s account of the ‘secret history of primitive accumulation’ 
illuminates the strategic regulation by early liberal political economists and 
policymakers of ‘self provisioning’, the capacity of people to meet their own 
subsistence needs outside of, or without dependence on, the employment relationship 
(Perelman, 2000). Alongside the enclosures of common lands, 18th and 19th century 
policy makers and their political economist allies learned carefully to manage a mix of 
self-provisioning and wage labour in order to minimise the cost of labour. ‘They 
wanted’, Perelman writes, ‘to make sure that workers would be able to be self-sufficient 
enough to raise the rate of surplus value’ – self-provisioning as a wage subsidy – 
‘without making them so independent that they would or could resist wage labor’ 
(2000: 107).16 The continuous form of primitive accumulation through the regulation of 
self-provisioning was ‘a matter of degree. … capital would manipulate the extent to 
which workers relied on self-provisioning’, and hence the degree to which they 
depended on employers, ‘in order to maximize its advantage’ (2000: 32). 
As Toynbee (quoted above) argues, popular music performers’ ability to sell their 
services to a number of buyers enabled them to avoid dependence on any single one.17 
Although the recording contract is an employment contract, and state law treats 
recording artists as employees, their relative independence along these lines renders 
them more like independent contractors, market participants with little or no capital 
who ‘are able to protect themselves, to some extent, from work-related risks…because 
they self-insure themselves, to some extent, by spreading their risks’ among a number 
of clients (Davidov, 2002: 394). Michael Perelman argues that ‘the struggle against 
self-provisioning is not confined to the distant past. It continues to this day’ (2000: 11). 
I’m suggesting that popular music performers’ incomes from live appearances, 
licensing and merchandising functioned as a form of self-provisioning (within the 
market, yes, but not subject to record company claims), relieving recording artists from 
total dependence on record companies. This is precisely what the RIAA was 
__________ 
16 An exemplary target for this kind of policy was the English kitchen garden, the size of which was 
carefully regulated in the early 19th century. Perelman quotes Robert Gourlay, who in1822 declared 
that ‘[i]t is not the intention to make labourers professional gardeners or farmers! It is intended to 
confine them to bare convenience’ (2000: 108). 
17 At the same time, of course, artists’ non-recording income subsidizes record companies. See 
producer Steve Albini’s grim (1997) calculations. 
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complaining about in its 1985 arguments for the (1987) legislative carve out of 
recording artists from protection by California’s seven year rule (quoted above).18  
This principle is at the heart of recent legal analyses of the 360 deal. According to Ian 
Brereton, in addition to their income participation,  
[t]he major labels’ retention of final-decision making rights on all recording, touring, 
merchandising, and publishing activities forces artists, and ultimately their creative endeavors, to 
be subject to the complete control of their record label.  
Casting this new relationship as a partnership, he writes, would be false; ‘under this 
new type of agreement, the complete sacrifice of control to one party violates an 
important principle of partnership law’, which requires mutual rights of control (2009: 
195-196). Before the advent of the 360 deal, argues Tracy Gardner, an artist attempting 
to avoid involuntary servitude (‘in which the victim is forced to work…by use or threat 
of coercion through law or legal process’) by breaching her contract would be faced 
only with the loss of recording revenues. Under the new deal, where companies 
participate administratively and economically in non-recording activities like touring, 
licensing, merchandising, and so on, the artist ‘is faced with a lack of alternate revenue 
streams upon which artists before her could rely’ (Gardner, 2006: 755). 360 deals ‘only 
add to the unconscionability of the artists’ situation because artists have lost control 
over the ability to convert their musical fame into other financial opportunities’ 
(Gardner, 2006: 750). The 360 deal represents capital’s identification as a limit of what 
before had been simply a conventional separation between spheres of economic activity 
under its control and those under the control of the artist.  
Despite radical challenges to the industry’s business model, the major labels offer 
opportunities for which (aspiring) recording artists compete vigorously; pressure on 
aspirants to sign anything in order to enter what Steve Greenfield and Guy Osborn call 
the record deal’s ‘holy of holies’ (1998: 177) means that if the 360 deal is what’s on 
offer, few without significant bargaining power or attractive alternatives will be able to 
resist it. Abandoned by increasing numbers of file-sharing (non-) consumers, record 
company capital pushes in another direction, transcending former barriers, colonizing 
new regions of musical economic activity, and consolidating new dimensions of 
political control, particularly over legions of new artists in weak bargaining positions. 
Conclusion 
Throughout the 80s and 90s the RIAA engaged in a series of public, political contests 
with recording artists over several of the elements of state and federal legislation that 
set the terms of their contractual engagement. The two sides experienced differing 
degrees of success and failure in these contests, but the largely or apparently stable 
nature of the ‘playing field’ itself assured the incremental nature of most of the resulting 
changes. In the early 2000s, in the face of digitalization and file-sharing’s apparently 
tectonic destabilisation of the record industry, the emerging ‘360 degree deal’ promised 
__________ 
18 This argument was also made in MCA’s complaint against Newton-John. 
ephemera 10(3/4): 337-356 Primitive accumulation, the social common… 
articles  Stahl 
353 
a way in which record companies and recording artists could continue to profit in the 
face of declining sales through the record companies’ investment and participation in 
formerly off-limits forms of economic activity such as touring, licensing, and 
merchandising. ‘Given their command of the entire recorded music industry’, writes 
Tracy Gardner,  
it is hardly surprising that the record labels are quickly gaining control over new revenue streams 
as well as traditional revenue channels that once belonged solely to the artist (2006: 751).  
Yet, while this ‘new deal’ is still nascent, it appears to herald intensified relations of 
control and appropriation between record companies and recording artists.  
This article has argued that both incremental changes in legislated authority relations 
and in private contractual conventions can be understood through the theoretical lens of 
primitive accumulation, a mode of political and class power exercised by capital to 
overcome limits to its expansion. Recording artists can be understood as an illuminating 
case of continuity and change in the social relations of cultural production under 
conditions of digitalization and the widespread unauthorised distribution of cultural 
commodities enabled by internet technologies. Seen from the primitive accumulation 
perspective, the persistence of binding, long-term option contracts is not anomalous in 
the context of digitizing, flexibilizing, 21st century terrains of employment. Rather, 
these new contracts are admirably suited to the maintenance of low-obligation cultural 
industry ‘options’ where the principal difference is found in the types of boundaries, 
limits, and obstacles encountered by record company capital in its pursuit of greater 
freedom favourably to arrange its artist employment relations. In this light, the impetus 
of cultural industry enterprise toward the intensification of long term capture and 
control of ‘golden-egg’ laying talent appears not to subside but to change form and 
venue.  
When applied to the work of recording artists, categories like ‘involuntary servitude’ 
and ‘primitive accumulation’ sound strange. Their use in this context depends on a 
degree of abstraction that itself requires the putting aside of popular images and 
narratives of expressive individuals enjoying un-alienated lives and sometimes great 
fame and wealth. But it is precisely recording artists’ extraordinary autonomy that 
constitutes certain aspects of their value, that makes their legal protections the targets of 
repeated employer attacks, and that makes their struggles so dramatic, so capable of 
bringing obscure logics into high relief. This examination of some of the legal dynamics 
of their unusually autonomous careers, of the laws that enable and constrain their 
capacity to say ‘no’ to the various historically-conditioned demands of their employers, 
argues that problems of autonomy and control have been and remain central to the 
relationships of recording artists and their record companies. Laws and conventions that 
preserve and protect this capacity pose impediments to the ability of record companies 
to extend their advantage, provoking reactions that, until recently, often took place in 
public, before legislators, and that now appear increasingly to be taking place in private 
negotiations over new contractual territories. 
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